Dealing with delay in statutory appeals from findings of a disciplinary tribunal

Under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 an appeal from a decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) lies to the High Court. Similar rights of appeal exist under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 (against a decision of the MPTS) and section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 (from a decision of the PCC or Practice Committee).

CPR Part 52 deals with appeals by statutory right on the basis that the findings of the Tribunal were wrong or unjust. The institution of such appeal requires an Appellant’s Notice to be filed within 21 days of the date that written reasons are provided for the decision (to which see the Practice Direction). There is no statutory or other provision for the Court to be able to grant an extension of time except for the general power in CPR, Part 3 to grant an extension of time for compliance with any rule contained within its general powers of management. Consequently, such a jurisdiction is equated with an application for relief from sanctions and the same principles apply (see Taylor v SRA [2019] EWHC 201). Such application should be made when the Appellant’s Notice is filed.

What are the principles?

The principles (known as the Mitchell/Denton principles) to be applied by the Court when evaluating whether to grant relief require the Court to undertake a three-stage test:

1. Identify the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply;
2. Consider why the default occurred;
3. Evaluate all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application.

How are the principles applied where there has been delay in submitting a statutory appeal?

In the recent case of Bandla v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2025] EWHC 1167, the High Court considered an application made by a solicitor to appeal against a decision to strike him off the Roll made by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in May 2017.

The Court decided that the delay (seven years, 2 months and 26 days) was both serious and significant. The gaps in the medical evidence provided by the Appellant in this case provided no justifiable basis for how the default occurred. The Court went on to look at “all the circumstances of the case”.  Mr Justice Fordham said:

“I have had regard to the overriding objective; and the interests of justice. I have also had regard to the strong public interest in finality, in the context of regulatory proceedings, which operate ultimately for public protection and public confidence. I have asked myself – as the relevant Article 6 question in the context of appeals and extensions of time – whether the refusal of an extension of time by this Court today would constitute either a “removal” or an “impairment” of the “essence” of the right of appeal. But I am entirely satisfied that it would do neither of those things. I have also had regard to the headline points that the Appellant made about the strength of his appeal”.

In Taylor (see above) a delay of 13 months was deemed to be very serious and significant and the application for relief was refused.

But in Lorrell v SRA [2019] EWCA 981 an application based on a 21-day delay because of the ill-health of a family member was granted as there was no prejudice to the SRA. Similar applications based on short delays were granted in Ip v SRA [2018] EWHC 957 and Blacker v SRA [2017] EWHC 892.

Commentary

Thus, we can extract the following principles when examining a relief application for delay in the filing of a statutory appeal against the finding of a disciplinary tribunal.

1. How long is the delay? As soon as judgment is published, prospective appellant should seek immediate advice from counsel on the question of whether viable grounds exist. The longer the delay the less likely the application is to be granted.
2. Why did the Appellant fail to file the appeal on time? What is the evidential basis for this failure?
3. Would refusal of relief detract from the essence of the right to appeal? In essence, what is the merit in the appeal? Only where appeals are very strong or very weak do merits have a part to play. Would there be any “great and irremediable injustice” in the refusal hear any appeal whatever the delay (see Kaberry v SRA [2012] EWHC 3883)?
4. There is a strong public interest in finality.
5. There must be an evidential basis to justify medical reasons for delay.

Decisions affecting a professional’s ability to practice can have devastating consequences both financially and reputationally. Those made subject to such decisions must take advice expeditiously and act quickly in the preparation of any appeal as failure to do may present an insurmountable obstacle.

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