Court of Appeal quashes immediate custodial sentence after sentencing judge had suggested it might be suspended if defendant pleaded guilty
August 25, 2026
Mar 30, 2026 | By: Vicky Lankester
In January 2026, Westminster Magistrates’ Court handed down a judgment that – despite involving something as apparently mundane as fare evasion – raised questions about who is legally allowed to prosecute criminal cases. The case of Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR) v Charles Brohiri was the first publicised challenge following the judgment in Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB), where it was ruled that unauthorised law firm employees are not allowed to conduct litigation. Our blog on that case can be found here. Mazur is the subject of an extant appeal in the Court of Appeal.
The facts
Charles Brohiri faced a long list of fare‑evasion charges (83 in total) contrary to section 5(3) Regulation of Railways Act 1889 between February 2024 to November 2025. On the surface, this was a typical private prosecution brought by a train operating company – something rail companies have done for decades. The charges were split as follows:
The defence argued that the category 1 offences had not been lawfully brought, and so should be dismissed against Mr Brohiri.
The defence argument: the prosecutions were not lawful
Mr Brohiri’s representative submitted that the prosecutions were not lawful for three reasons.
Lay prosecutors were conducting “reserved legal activities” unlawfully
Under the Legal Services Act 2007 (specifically sections 12-14 and Schedule 2, paragraph 4(1)), only authorised or exempt persons can conduct litigation or exercise rights of audience. Laying an information (the act that starts a prosecution) counts as conducting litigation. If an unauthorised or non-exempt person does it without authorisation or exemption, the defence argued, the proceedings are null and void.
The defence argued that GTR is not a regulated body in respect of legal services and by laying an information and applying for a summons a lay prosecutor commenced the proceedings which rendered them null and void ab initio (void from the beginning). They relied on the judgment in Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB), where the High Court stated that “mere employment by a person who is authorised to conduct litigation is not sufficient for the employee to conduct litigation themselves, even under supervision” (at paragraph 49). They also relied on Media Protection services Ltd v Crawford [2012] EWHC 2373 (Admin), which ruled that the laying of information is the commencement of proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court and was “conduct in litigation” and a “reserved legal activity” in accordance with the Act. Further, by laying an information, the lay prosecutor is in breach of section 14 Legal Services Act 2007 and has committed a criminal offence.
The Criminal Procedure Rules were not followed
The defence also argued that the summons applications did not contain the required information as specified in the Criminal Procedure Rules. The defence relied on the case of R (Kay) v Leeds Magistrates’ Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin), where the High court held that a Magistrates’ Court’s jurisdiction to issue a summons depended on the proper laying of information. As such, the defence argued that compliance with the correct forms and procedural requirements is not a mere formality but a precondition to valid proceedings. Failure to comply with the requirements rendered the prosecutions void.
Even if technically valid, the case was an abuse of process
Allowing a prosecution allegedly founded on unlawful acts (the breach of section 14 of the Legal Services Act 2007), they argued, would be an illegal prosecution and undermine the integrity of the justice system. As such, the prosecution would be an abuse of process and should be stayed.
They argued that the Court should either dismiss the category 1 charges in their entirety as the commencement and conduct of the proceedings were invalid or it should find that the prosecution’s contravention of the Legal Services Act 2007 amounted to a serious abuse of process and should be permanently stayed.
The prosecution response: “this is how it’s always worked”
GTR’s legal team countered with a very different view:
Lay prosecutors are exempt—because the Criminal Procedure Rules say so
Rule 46.1 of the Criminal Procedure Rules explicitly allows an employee of a prosecutor (i.e. a non-legally qualified person) to apply for a summons. GTR argued that this rule is an “enactment” capable of granting exemption under the Legal Services Act, meaning that a lay prosecutor was entitled to lay an information. They argued that the defence had not provided an answer that Rule 46.1 does not allow the prosecutor to do what had been done in this case. The long‑standing industry practice of using lay prosecutors was well‑known to courts.
Further, even if a lay prosecutor laying an information amounts to a breach of the Act in conducting litigation when not authorised or exempt, it was not the intention of Parliament that such a breach would invalidate the proceedings. Separately, Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) did not apply to the facts of this case.
A failure to follow the Criminal Procedure Rules did not cause unfairness or prejudice to the defendant
The prosecution argued that the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules had been complied with in that the draft summons set out who the defendant is, the offence, conduct of the particulars alleged and the name and address of the person who laid the information and name of the prosecutor. As such, no prejudice was caused to the defendant.
There had been no abuse
The prosecution argued that there was no abuse because there had not been any unfairness either in breaching the Criminal Procedure Rules or in the use of lay prosecutors. The high threshold required for the integrity of the criminal justice system being at risk had not been reached in this case.
The proceedings were properly initiated and there was no suggestion as to how the defendant had been prejudiced. Indeed, the defendant accepted he failed to pay the fares (thereby admitting his guilt) when the proceedings were brought against him.
The Court’s decision
The District Judge found in favour of GTR. His reasons were as follows.
Lay prosecutors are exempt persons
The judge accepted GTR’s detailed analysis:
Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) and other cases relied on by the defence were distinguished as irrelevant.
Even if there had been a breach of the Legal Services Act 2007 in the commencement of the proceedings, the consequences of the breach where a lay prosecutor started proceedings, in reliance upon Rule 46.1 of the Criminal Procedure Rules, would not necessarily be an invalidity.
Further, the District Judge did not agree that the laying of the information for an application for a summons by a non-authorised or non-exempt person is itself a criminal act under section 14 Legal Services Act 2007 because there is a defence in that if the person applying for the summons did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that an offence was being committed. Given that there has been an industry wide use of non-authorised employees to lay informations which has been a longstanding process, an individual who carried out a reserved legal activity would have a defence.
A breach of the requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007 was not intended by Parliament to result in a nullity, in accordance with the Court of Appeal judgment in Ndole Assets Ltd v Designer M&E Services Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2865. It was GTR’s understanding that those individuals addressing the Court were permitted to do so because of the long-standing practice in the Magistrates’ Court allowing them to conduct advocacy. The Court has been aware of this arrangement for a number of years, and the District Judge agreed it was arguable that in these circumstances the Court has granted rights of audience which would fall into the Schedule 3 exemptions through long-standing practice and convention.
Even if there were breaches, they don’t void the case
The District Judge agreed with the prosecution that Parliament did not intend such breaches to render proceedings a nullity. He said that the Court is the arbiter and would not issue a summons if it did not contain all the necessary information.
Further, he agreed that the defence had failed to provide any details or prejudice or unfairness to the defendant.
No abuse of process
The threshold for abuse is high and was not met in this case. The District Judge found:
As such, the District Judge refused to strike out the charges and the prosecution stood.
Comment
This judgment is more than a dispute about unpaid fares. It clarifies that non-lawyers can start criminal proceedings, if authorised by the Criminal Procedure Rules. Further, years of accepted procedure carries weight and is relevant to such considerations.
This decision will reassure rail companies, local authorities, and other bodies that rely on lay staff to initiate prosecutions. It also signals that Courts will not lightly invalidate proceedings on technicalities where no unfairness or prejudice to the defendant is shown.
Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR) v Charles Brohiri confirms that the criminal justice system can accommodate practical realities – such as non‑lawyers handling routine prosecutions – without compromising legality or fairness, and means that defendants will find it difficult for prosecutions to be struck out on technicality points.
Charles Brohiri was ultimately sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months and fined over £3,600 for the unpaid fares having pleaded guilty to all of the charges.
Articles are intended as an introduction to the topic and do not constitute legal advice